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Abstract
In this paper, we explain the observed lower hours worked in Central and Nordic
European countries since the 80s, relative to Anglo-Saxon countries, through the
eﬀects of the tax beneﬁt/systems on the employment rate. To this end we develop
a search and matching economy ` a la Pissarides that then we use as laboratory to
conduct several quantitative experiences using an accounting method.
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1Introduction
Roughly since the 70s, most European countries have showed worse labor market
performances than the United States. In particular, the aggregate work eﬀort in
Europe has been lower, whereas the tax/beneﬁts systems have been more generous
and have implied more rigid institutions than in the United States. The interesting
issue of understanding in which way the lower work eﬀort in Europe has been
shaped by the Tax/Beneﬁt systems have generated a large number of papers. Our
contribution to this rich literature consists in conducting a quantitative exercise
allowing to assess the role of several tax/beneﬁt-related variables in explaining the
diﬀerences in total hours worked across a large sample countries. To this end, we
follow the procedure advocated in Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2006) and further
developed in Langot and Quintero-Rojas (2008b).
In brad terms, we proceed as follows. First, we analyze some data regarding sev-
eral features of the labor market of 10 OECD countries over the 1980-2003 period.
To easier the discussion, countries are grouped according to a broad socioeconomic
criteria into Central, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. Central European coun-
tries include Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and Austria. Nordic European countries
include Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, and Anglo-Saxon countries include the
United Kingdom and the United Sates. Next, we develop a theoretical economy that
then we use as laboratory to asses the relative weight of several tax/beneﬁt-related
variables in explaining the evolution of total hours worked. In view of the fact that
since the 80s the employment has largely driven the dynamics of the hours worked1,
we develop a search economy ` a la Pissarides with bargaining only on wages. That
is, we assume that all the adjustments are done along the extensive margin, whereas
the number of hours worked per employee is ﬁxed. Finally, in broad terms, the quan-
titative evaluation of the model is worth to measure the size of the “error” that is
produced by introducing actual data on the labor-market-equilibrium conditions.
So, the closer the error is to zero, the better the model explains the data.
1See Langot and Quintero-Rojas (2008b) for a deeper discussion on this point, or Bassanini and Duval
(2006) who provide a review of recent literature on this topic, or even Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) or
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007a), (2007b) and (2008b) for former evidence on this lines.
21 Some Facts
This part is consecrated to a triﬂing analysis of some data over the 1980-2003 pe-
riod2. On the one side, we look at the aggregate hours worked and employment. On
the other side, we focus on various labor market indicators typical of the tax/beneﬁt
systems. These are: the average tax rates on labor income (τw), on consumption
(τc) and payroll taxes (τf). The average replacement rate on the ﬁrst year (arr),
and the bargaining power of workers (1 − ǫ). Even if from this analysis we cannot
deduce evident relations between work eﬀort and institutions, given the magnitude
of the last ones, and their likely impact on employment, we try later to asses the
role of institutions on shaping the employment dynamics, and then the aggregate
hours dynamics.
1.1 Aggregate hours worked and employment
Aggregate hours of market work (H) are simply deﬁned as the product of the aver-
age annual hours worked per person in employment (h) and the employment (N).
To be able to do comparisons across countries of quite diﬀerent sizes, we normal-
ize this measure by the active population (A). We observe some relevant aspects
of aggregate hours worked from 1980 to 2003 (see top panels of ﬁgures 1-3). In
particular, at the beginning of the period, in all Central European countries the
aggregate hours show a weak decline. However, soon after, they show virtually no
trend, an they are even increasing at the end. The only exception is France, where
hours were slightly declining over the whole period. Similar path, but less marked,
is founded in most Nordic countries as well as in the United Kingdom. Conversely,
in the United States aggregate hours are declining at the end, whereas in Finland we
observed a sharp adjustment period, from 1989 to 1993, towards much lower (but
increasing) levels. Nonetheless, the striking regularity across all countries (maybe
less marked in Austria) is that the employment rates exhibit pretty similar trend
changes as aggregate hours (see bottom panels of ﬁgures 1-3).
2See the section Parameterization for data sources and further description.
3Figure 1: Total hours dynamics & Employment dynamics - Central European countries



























Figure 2: Total hours dynamics & Employment dynamics - Nordic European countries





















4Figure 3: Total hours dynamics & Employment dynamics - Anglo-Saxon countries
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For the ﬁscal variables, we use the series of the average tax rates on consumption
and labor income constructed by McDaniel (2007), whereas the payroll tax rates are
deduced from the OECD data on wages and salaries and compensation of employees.
Figures 4 and 5 show the dynamics in each country of the several taxes that deﬁne
our tax wedge (τ)3: the payroll tax (τf), the tax on labor income (τw) and the tax
on consumption (τc). These ﬁgures show that in all Nordic and Central European
countries, except Spain, the tax wedge as well as the taxes on labor are higher
than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Contrary, the consumption tax is more or less
homogeneous and soaring in all countries apart from Italy, Spain and the United
States where it is much lower.
1.3 Bargaining power
As long as we known, there are no time series estimations of the worker’s bargaining
power in each country. Nevertheless, we have two statistical indicators that give a
3The tax wedge is deﬁned as τt ≡
(1+τf,t)(1+τc,t)
1−τw,t , so that by construction it could be grater than one,
and it has not evident economic meaning.
5Figure 4: Labor income tax (τw) & Payroll tax (τf)
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6Figure 5: Consumption tax (τc) & Tax wedge (τ)
















































































7good idea of the power of employees during the wage bargaining process: the union
coverage and the union density. Indeed, a large union coverage or a high union
density imply a low probability for the employee of being alone during the bargain.
Then, the worker’s bargaining power, 1 − ǫi,t, is settled equal to the average of the
union coverage and the union density, using the Bassanini and Duval (2006)’ data.
According to the left-hand side panel of ﬁgure 6, we have the following classiﬁca-
tion. Countries where workers have higher bargaining power than ﬁrms: Belgium,
Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden; countries where workers and ﬁrms have simi-
lar bargaining power: France, Netherlands and the United Kingdom; and countries
where workers have lower bargaining power than ﬁrms: Spain and the United States.
1.4 Unemployment beneﬁts
Other key component of the tax/beneﬁt systems are the unemployment beneﬁts,
which are mainly driven by the average rate of replacement during the ﬁrst year
(Bassanini and Duval 2006) and the wage rate net of taxes. From the right-hand
side panel of ﬁgure 6, we observe that over the whole period most countries show
average replacement rates on the ﬁrst year of unemployment (arr) ranking between
20% and 40%. The few exceptions are the United States, where the replacement
rate is below 20%, the Netherlands, where it exceeds the 40%, and Spain, where
this rate is equal to zero until around 1992.
2 The search economy
In this section we present the theoretical economy that will be use as “laboratory”
for our accounting experiences. Since we are interested on assessing the relative
weight of ﬁscal policy and some labor market institutions on the extensive margin of
the aggregate working time, the natural candidate is the neo-classical growth model
where the labor market equilibrium is determined by a search process and a wage
bargaining process. By construction, the model already features several institutions:
costs of search and matching, unemployment beneﬁts and the bargaining power of
workers. So we just extend it to include the following ﬁscal variables: taxes on labor
income, on consumption and payroll taxes.
8Figure 6: Bargaining power of workers (1 − ǫ) & Average replacement rate (arr)































































92.1 Labor market ﬂows
Employment is predetermined at each time and changes only gradually as workers
separate from jobs, at the exogenous rate s, or unemployed agents ﬁnd jobs, at the
hiring rate Mt. Let Nt and Vt, respectively be the number of workers and the total
number of new jobs made available by ﬁrms, then employment evolves according to
Nt+1 = (1 − s)Nt + Mt
with Mt = V
ψ
t (1 − Nt)1−ψ, 0 < ψ < 1.
2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households whose measure
is normalized to one. Each household consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived
agents. The household’s members faces an employment lottery at each period, so
that a fraction Nt will be employed while the remaining 1−Nt will be seeking a job.
Employed agents work a ﬁxed amount of time h at the wage rate of wt. Unemployed
agents receives the unemployment beneﬁts bt, until they are randomly matched with
job vacancies. But in both states, their incomes are taxed at rate τw,t.
As is usual in this literature, individual idiosyncratic risks faced by each agent in





t ,1 − h) + (1 − Nt)U(Cu
t )] (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Cn
t and Cu
t stand for the consumption of
employed and unemployed agents. Consumption goods are taxed at rate τc,t. The
contemporaneous utility function is assumed to be increasing and concave in both




t + Γz, z = n,u.
where Γn = Γn(h) = σ ln(1 − h) and Γu = Γu(0) = 0.
Households owns ﬁrms and capital Kt, which is rented to ﬁrms at net price
(rt + δ), where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. We assume a balanced
10budget at each period. Then, the budget constraint of the representative household
is:
(1 + τc,t)[NtCn
t + (1 − Nt)Cu
t ] + Kt+1 − (1 + rt)Kt = (2)
(1 − τw,t)[Ntwtht + (1 − Nt)bt] + Lt + πt
In last expression πt are lump-sum dividends remitted by ﬁrms and Lt is a lump-sum
transfer from the government.
A household’s employment opportunities evolve as follows:
Nt+1 = (1 − s)Nt + Ψt(1 − Nt) (3)
Ψ ≡ Mt/(1 − Nt) is the rate at which unemployed agents ﬁnd jobs.
Then, each household chooses {Cn
t ,Cu
t ,Kt+1|t ≥ 0} to maximize (1) subject to
the labor supply constraint (3) and to the budget constraint (2). This program can







t ,1 − h) + (1 − Nt)U(Cu
t ,1) + βWH(Kt+1)
￿
(4)
Let λt be the shadow price of the budget constraint. Then, the optimality conditions
are,
(Cu
t )−1 = (Cn
t )−1 ≡ (Ct)−1 = (1 + τc,t)λt (5)
β(1 + rt+1)λt+1 = λt (6)
2.3 Firms
There are many identical ﬁrms in the economy. Each ﬁrm chooses a number Vt of
job vacancies, produces consumption goods and pays wages, capital services and a
payroll tax τf. The unit cost of maintaining an open vacancy is ω. Each ﬁrm has
access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology to produce output:
Yt = AtKα
t (Nth)1−α, 0 < α < 1 (7)
Job vacancies are matched at the constant rate Φt = Mt/Vt. Hence, a ﬁrm’s labor
employment evolves as
Nt+1 = (1 − s)Nt + ΦtVt (8)











(Yt − (rt + δ)Kt − ωtVt − (1 + τf,t)wtNth) (9)
subject to the constraint (7), and to the labor constraint (8). This program can be































The government levies taxes to ﬁnance expenditures. We assume a balanced budget
at each period, so that any revenue that is not used to ﬁnance current purchases
is transferred to households in a lump-sum payment. Thus, real transfer stream to
households is given by:
Lt = τc,t[NtCn
t + (1 − Nt)Cu
t ] + (τf,t + τw,t)wthtNt − bt(1 − τw,t)(1 − Nt) (13)
2.5 Nash bargaining














the marginal value for a match for a worker, and ǫt denotes the ﬁrm’s bargaining
power at date t. In coherence with our empirical measure of the worker’s bargaining
power this parameter varies over time and across countries.
12The ﬁrst order condition of this problem implies the following sharing rule of
the bargained surplus:
ǫt(1 + τf,t)VH
t = (1 − ǫt)λt(1 − τw,t)VF
t (15)
which in turn implies the following wage contracts:4









bt + τt(Γu − Γn)Ct
￿
(16)
where the tax wedge is deﬁned as:
τt ≡
(1 + τf,t)(1 + τc,t)
1 − τw,t






























As we can see, the bargained wage is aﬀected in a complex way by the ﬁscal
variables: τc, τf and τw, the tax/beneﬁt variables: ǫt, bt and ω, and by the labor
market tightness, deﬁned as θt ≡ Vt/(1 − Nt) = Ψt/Φt.
2.6 Equilibrium on the labor market
In this section we deduce the theoretical equation determining the equilibrium allo-
cation of work. This will then evaluated in a quantitative manner in next section.
2.6.1 Supply side
The labor supply is determined by the wage contract (16). Once we index the
unemployment beneﬁts to the wage, bt = arrtwth where arrt denotes the average
replacement rate, the wage equation can then be rewritten as:












τt(Γu − Γn)Ct (17)
This equation describes opportunity cost of working for a marginal employee as
the sum of two components: the bargained surplus and the reservation wage. The
reservation wage is only aﬀected by the tax/beneﬁt system (tax wedge and unem-
ployment beneﬁts), whereas the bargained surplus is aﬀected by other labor market
frictions through the search costs.
4See Ch´ eron and Langot (2004) for more details on the wage bargaining process in the neo-classical
growth model with matching.
132.6.2 Demand side
After the wage bargaining process, the right to manage assumption leads the ﬁrms
to hire a number of workers given the labor cost per employee (17). Then, the labor
demand of the ﬁrm is determined by the vacancies equation, which together with















or, equivalently, after reordering terms and delaying one period,
(1 + τf,t)wth = (1 − α)
Yt
Nt











This equation describes the return from the marginal employee as the sum of the
instantaneous and the intertemporal returns from labor.
2.7 Measuring the “goodness of ﬁtness” of the model
In broad terms, the quantitative evaluation of the model and the impact of distor-
tions is based on the computation of series for the gap (∆) between the marginal
cost of labor (MCL, equation (17)) and its marginal return (MRL, equation (18))
that is produced using actual data. That is,




If ∆ = 0, the model exactly accounts for the observed data. Then, from an
econometric perspective, the closer is the “error” ∆ to zero, the better is the “good-
ness of ﬁtness” of our theoretical economy.
3 Empirical results from the accounting exer-
cise
Finally, in this section we conduct a quantitative evaluation of our theoretical econ-
omy. To this end, we ﬁrst ﬁx some parameters and give values to the model vari-
ables. Then, in order to evaluate the impact of each tax/beneﬁt-related variable,
we propose the following decomposition. First, we introduce only search costs in
14the measure of the marginal return of employment. In this way we evaluate the
country-speciﬁc dynamics of the labor market tightness. In a second step, our ob-
jective is to measure the relative impact of ﬁscal variables, so we introduce only
the country-speciﬁc dynamics of taxes. Next, we assess the relative role of some
country-speciﬁc labor market institutions, to know: the separation rate, the bar-
gaining power and the unemployment beneﬁts. This modiﬁes both the marginal
return of employment and the marginal cost of employment. Finally, in order to as-
sess the global impact of the tax/beneﬁt systems, we consider simultaneously both
sources of heterogeneity: the labor market institutions and taxation.
3.1 Parameterization
Data on consumption, gross domestic product (GDP), employment, unemployment,
population, wages and salaries, compensation of employees, the deﬂator of consump-
tion and the deﬂator of GDP (base year 2000) are from the OECD. Series for hours
worked are from the Groningen Growth and Development Center and the Confer-
ence Board,5.
The discount parameter is such that β = 0.985. The elasticity of the matching
function with respect to vacancies is equal to ψ = 0.6 (Blanchard and Diamond
1992). The ratio of aggregate recruiting expenditures to output (ωtVt/Yt) equal 1%
(Andolfatto 1996). α = .4 and σ = 2 (Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson 2006). We set
ω equal to the mean over both time and countries. The unemployment beneﬁts are
computed as the product of the average replacement rate (Bassanini and Duval 2006)
and the wage rate net of taxes. We also take into account the heterogeneity in the
separation rate, si, which is calibrated in order to reproduce in each country the
average unemployment duration for the 1985-1994 period estimated by Blanchard
and Portugal (2001). This is done as follows. Using data for employment Ni,t and
unemployment Ui,t, we can compute the series of job destructions, Di,t and job
creations, Mi,t, as:
Di,t = siNi,t−1 (20)
Mi,t = piUi,t−1 (21)
5Total Economy Database, January 2007: http://www.ggdc.net
15where pi is the inverse of the average unemployment spell. Moreover, we have that:
Mi,t = Ni,t − Ni,t−1 + Di,t (22)
Then, we deduce that:




The average unemployment spells and the corresponding destruction rates are sum-
marized in table 1.
Table 1: Unemployment duration and the job destruction rate.
Country Belgium Spain France Italy Netherlands
1
p
∗ (months) 23 41 20 30 20.5
s (%) 5.72 6.15 6.10 5.80 3.60
Country Austria Finland Sweden United Kingdom United States
1
p
∗ (months) 7 7 5 10 2.5
s (%) 5.49 16.09 13.39 10.40 30.48
∗: Source: Blanchard and Portugal (2001). The authors construct monthly ﬂows into unem-
ployment as the average number of workers unemployed for less than one month, for the period
1985-1994, divided by the average labor force during the same period. The source of these
data is the OECD duration database. Unemployment duration is constructed as the ratio of
the average unemployment rate for the period 1985-1994 to the ﬂow into unemployment.
Next, according with our model we compute series for the rate at which workers





where U is the observed unemployment level. Then, using the deﬁnition of the
matching function we derive the market tightness (θ) and the rate at which vacancies








163.2 The role of search costs
The higher the unemployment rate, the higher is the probability to ﬁnd a worker
for a ﬁrm. Hence, in economies with high unemployment, search costs paid by ﬁrms
are low. In order to evaluate the magnitude of the search costs, we set the cost of
a vacancy to its country-average value, whereas the tax wedge, the unemployment
beneﬁts and the bargaining power of workers are all settled equal to zero. Because
our simple model does not introduce endogenous job separation, we set a constant
heterogeneity in the separation rate: s = Ei[si], where i denotes the country. Then
we compute the the “error” series ∆i as ∆i,t = 1−
MCNi,t
MRNi,t. Results from this exercise
are displayed in ﬁgure 7.
Since the search costs are lower in countries with high unemployment, and vis-
ceversa, it is natural to ﬁnd larger errors in Central and Nordic countries than in
the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the unemployment rate is signiﬁcantly smaller, so
that the value of an employee is relatively higher than in the other countries because
the search cost is higher for ﬁrms. However, even in the Anglo-Saxon counties the
“error” series ∆ still large because the weight of search costs is quite fair (according
to the construction and parameterization of this variable).
3.3 The role of ﬁscal policy
In order to quantitatively assess the relative weight of taxes on the observed employ-
ment dynamics, we set the labor market indicators to zero and we allow for positive
taxation. So ﬁrms have absolute bargaining power whereas the reservation wage is
just the marginal rate of substitution between employment and consumption, net
of taxes. Since in this conﬁguration the search is a costless process (ω = 0), there
are not intertemporal returns from labor.
As before, we compute the series ∆i. According to ﬁgure 8, the eﬀect of taxes
is not negligible, being particularly important in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in
Finland, in France and in Austria (and even in Italy and Belgium after 1992) where
taxes seems explain about 80% of the employment dynamics.
17Figure 7: Costs of search and matching









































































































































































Relative weight of search costs − Anglo−Saxon Countries
UK
US
In this conﬁguration we set τc,t = 0, τw,t = 0, τf,t = 0, 1 − ǫi,t = 0, arri,t = 0, si = Ei[si] ∀ i
and ω > 0.
18Figure 8: Tax rates









































































































































































Relative weight of Taxes − Anglo−Saxon Countries
UK
US
In this conﬁguration we set τc,t > 0, τw,t > 0, τf,t > 0, 1 − ǫi,t = 0, arri,t = 0, si = 0 and
ω = 0.
193.4 The role of labor market institutions
Now we assess the role of labor market institutions on the employment dynamics.
To this goal we set all taxes equal to zero and we introduce our country speciﬁc
labor market indicators. In doing so we can evaluate the impact of the heterogeneity
across countries of labor market institutions. The ∆i series are reported in ﬁgure 9.
The eﬀect of these country-speciﬁc labor market indicators is sharper than the eﬀect
of taxes in all the European countries (Central, Nordic and the United Kingdom).
Then, when the labor indicators point to the existence of high real rigidities, the
introduction of such variables in the theoretical model largely improves its ﬁt. Con-
versely, in the United States the observed labor market indicators are the lowest,
so that they have the smallest impact on the employment dynamics. Summing up,
this experience clearly shows that in all countries, the “errors” are largely reduced
when we take into account the country-speciﬁc heterogeneity of the labor market
indicators. In particular, in Sweden the model seems account for all the employment
dynamics (the “error” is around zero over the whole period), whereas in Belgium
and Austria the ﬁt is of more than 90%.
3.5 The joint impact of taxation and labor market in-
stitutions
Finally, in this last conﬁguration, we allow for full heterogeneity across countries,
so we introduce simultaneously the time-varying country-speciﬁc taxation and la-
bor market institutions. For most countries, this exercise produces the best ﬁt (see
ﬁgure 10), explaining almost the totality of the trend changes in the employment
rate in Belgium, France, Austria, the United States and in the United States. The
improvement with respect to the two previous economies is in part due to the un-
derestimation of the real wage when the model is evaluated without taxes. However,
the goodness of ﬁtness for Sweden is worst than with only labor market institutions
during the ﬁrst part of the period. Similarly, the Spanish and the Italian economies
show large wedges between theory and data at the beginning of the 80s. These large
errors at the beginning of the period may come from a particular initial condition
explained by institutional speciﬁcities: the end of the dictatorial Franco’s regime in
20Figure 9: Labor market institutions














































































































































































Relative weight of LMI − Anglo−Saxon Countries
UK
US
In this conﬁguration we set τc,t = 0, τw,t = 0, τf,t = 0, 1 − ǫi,t > 0, arri,t > 0, si > 0 and
ω > 0.
21Spain in the middle of the 70s, and for Italy, the large size of the informal sector
during the 60s and the 70s.
4 Concluding comments
In this paper we have conducted an accounting exercise to explain the observed
dynamics of aggregate hours of market work of a sample of ten industrialized coun-
tries. On the one hand, since the 70s the aggregate work eﬀort has been declining
in Nordic and Central European countries, relative to the United Kingdom and the
United States. On the other hand, we observe large diﬀerences even among Nordic
and Central European countries. A main source of heterogeneity between countries
are their tax/beneﬁt systems. This, together with the fact that since the 80s the
employment dynamics have largely shaped the dynamics of the aggregate hours of
market work, have oriented our approach: we have proposed an explanation of the
aggregate hours through the relative impact of several tax/beneﬁt-related variables
on the employment rate.
Our results show that the evolution of the labor market institutions explain
most of the employment rate dynamics in the Central European countries and in
the Nordic countries after around 1992. Conversely, taxes have a major role in
explaining the employment dynamics in the Nordic countries. When we allow for
a full heterogeneity (i.e. taxes and institutions), the model accounts for more than
80% of the trend changes in aggregate hours worked in most countries.
How to explain the remaining 20% not accounted by the model? The range of
possibilities is large. Without being exhaustive, we can highlight some of them.
First, this simple model is not accounting for the evolution of the number of hours
worked per employee. Langot and Quintero-Rojas (2008b), for instance, take into
account both margins in a shorter sample of countries, obtaining a slightly better
ﬁt. Second, our model also abstracts from the participation decision, which is an-
other important issue because this margin could be also largely sensitive to tax and
transfer programs such as policies on retirement or disability. On this point, Langot
and Quintero-Rojas (2008a) have quantiﬁed the relative importance of the exten-
sive and intensive margins on the observed diﬀerences across countries in aggregate
22Figure 10: Taxes and labor market institutions














































































































































































Joint impact of LMI and Taxes − Anglo−Saxon Countries
UK
US
In this conﬁguration we set τc,t > 0, τw,t > 0, τf,t > 0, 1 − ǫi,t > 0, arri,t > 0, si > 0 and
ω > 0.
23hours worked. Their counterfactual exercises show that the two dimensions of the
extensive margin, the employment rate and the participation rate, explain the most
of the total gap between regions. Finally, in some extent errors could come from
the inexact measure of the labor market indicators, such as the bargaining power of
workers or the job-separation rates. Nevertheless, from a transatlantic perspective,
our accounting experiences show that the lower aggregate hours of market work
observed in the European countries is mainly due to the real rigidities induced by
labor market institutions.
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